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Cryptographically signing XML, and normalizing it prior to signing, are
forbiddingly intricate problems in the general case. This is largely because
of the complexities of the XML Information Set. We can define a more
aggressive normalization, which dispenses with distinctions and features
which are unimportant in a large class of cases, and thus define a straight-
forwardly implementable and portable signature framework.
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1 Introduction
Both normalizing and signing XML appear to be hard problems, given the size and
complexity of the work of the W3C Signature working group,1 which has produced
recommendations on creating signatures for XML, as well as on the necessary prior
problem of canonicalizing XML.
The goal of such signing algorithms is to provide the assurance that an XML doc-
ument read from a file, received in a message, or retrieved from an XML database,
is the same as the document that was written, sent, or uploaded, and that it has
not been changed deliberately or accidentally. While reading and writing a file are
straightforward, it can sometimes be hard in practice to ensure that the sequence of
bytes deserialized from a network stack, or re-serialized from a database, are exactly
the same as the original ones, rather than a sequence of bytes deemed equivalent by
the rules of XML.
For each XML document, there is a set of other documents with trivially different
syntax – that is, they are equivalent for all practical purposes, but use single-quotes
rather than double-quotes for marking attributes, or have the attributes in a different
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order, or have ignorable (according to a DTD) whitespace differences between ele-
ments, or they appear in a different encoding. The process of canonicalization consists
of precisely defining and operationalizing this equivalence, and selecting one of the
documents in that set as the canonical representative of it. By this means an XML
document can be signed by signing the canonically equivalent document; this signature
is then valid for any other member of the equivalence class.
The W3C signature framework is complicated, firstly because it supports an intricate
mechanism for specifying the signing of rather general transformations of the input
document; and secondly because by aiming to make the equivalence class as small
as possible, it must be sensitive to many of the unavoidably intricate details of the
low-level syntax of XML documents. The complication and the sensitivity make XML
canonicalization hair-pullingly fragile.
This paper presents an alternative approach. By choosing to perform the canoni-
calization step at a more abstract level, we can make that step both simpler to specify
and simpler to implement, with a resulting object which may be very straightforwardly
signed. The resulting set of equivalent documents will be larger than for the W3C pro-
cedure, but this may be acceptable or even desirable, particularly in the case of a ‘data’
XML document as opposed to a ‘text’-markup document.
In Sect. 2 below, we review the problem of signing XML, and the assorted approaches
which have, with variously disputed success, attempted to achieve this. In Sect. 3, we
describe a proposed normalization procedure, and the class of documents which is
equivalent under the normalization. In Sect. 4 we describe two compatible implemen-
tations, for illustration, and briefly examine performance. We draw some conclusions
in Sect. 5.
A note on parsers: In order to fix terms, if nothing else, we should add here a note on
how XML documents are processed. The most widely-known XML interface is prob-
ably the ‘Document Object Model’,2 which represents the entire XML document as a
tree in memory, and defines functions for moving within, and querying, that tree; there
is also a class of so-called ‘pull’ APIs which support passing deserialized objects to an
application. There is a smaller class of general-purpose underlying parser models, and
the best known of these is the ‘push’ or event-based parser model best represented by
the Java parser SAX, a de facto standard described at http://www.saxproject.org.
This parses the token stream obtained from the serialized XML object and reports
its content as a sequence of ‘events’ corresponding to element beginnings and ends,
textual content, programming instructions, and so on. Higher-level APIs such as the
DOM will typically use such a parser internally, which may be swappable by the pro-
grammer. Crucially for our argument below, there is a rather small set of document
events which such parsers will report.
2 The problem of normalizing and signing XML
In a sturdily-reasoned essay, baldly titled ‘Why XML Security is Broken’, Peter Gut-
mann has discussed this problem, and suggested that the approach used by the W3C
2This is managed by the W3C DOM ‘Activity’ described at http://www.w3.org/DOM/ .
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WG is fundamentally mistaken [1]. It’s a broadly persuasive argument for the general
problem, but in the case of a large category of XML documents, the problem is not
as hard as this analysis suggests, precisely because we only rarely need to solve the
general problem.
The two key points that Gutmann makes are:
1. All cryptographic signature mechanisms are designed to sign a blob of bytes.
XML documents are not just blobs of bytes, so there’s a fundamental dislocation
here between what’s wanted and what’s available.
2. Signature mechanisms are designed to work with streams of bytes, so that it
matters from a practical point of view where the signature is located in a byte-
stream, and that the system knows from the outset which type of signature it is
expected to create or verify.
We do not further discuss point 2 in this paper, on the grounds that this represents an
engineering trade-off between making things easier for the writer of a signature, or the
reader of it. The mechanism described in Sect. 4 can cope with this metadata being
located at the beginning of a document or the end.
Gutmann’s solution to point 1 is not to normalize at all, but instead to regard the
on-disk or on-the-wire XML document as the blob of bytes to be signed. This works
to some extent, but throws away the mutability of XML, which means that if one
wants to do anything with the XML other than simply admire it, or if one wants to
round-trip the XML into and out of a system which doesn’t know about signatures,
one is presented with the dilemma of either abandoning the signature, or else worrying
about how to reproduce exactly the same blob of bytes when the XML is serialized at
some later stage. One option is to store the original bytes alongside the parsed form,
and make these available for subsequent inspection; but this redundancy will be at
least inconvenient, probably brittle, and possibly impractical if the data volume is at
all large.
It is part of the point of XML that XML documents are not just blobs of bytes, but
represent a structure which is not brittle in the face of minor textual changes. This
robustness is what enables a rich range of higher-level applications. XML processors
and editors freely take advantage of this: it is generally hard to guarantee what flavour
of quotes will be written by an XSLT transformer, or that (formally or practically
insignificant) whitespace will be preserved by XML editors. The consequence of this is
that even the result of an XML identity transformation will not match the input byte-
for-byte, in a large fraction of cases; such an identity transformation is what happens
in practice when one opens and immediately resaves a document in an XML editor,
or logs a copy of an input document in an XML workflow.3 Schemas or DTDs can
make this mutability more pronounced, since amongst other things they can license
more extensive syntactic transformations.
3Sect. 3.4 of the XSLT standard is as compact and lucid as everything else in that standard, but it
still takes several paragraphs, and implicit reference to the XPath and XML standards, to describe
what text nodes are and are not removed; the xsl:output element is also involved in governing
the whitespace which appears in XML output.
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An XML document is fundamentally a tree serialised into bytes; indeed, at the
slight risk of being metaphysical, we might assert that this tree – in contrast to any
particular serialization into bytes – is the XML document we wish to sign. This
means that Gutmann’s solution, though it is implementable, works by signing an
otherwise insignificant and transient detail of the XML document. More practically,
this syntactic mutability is reflected in the fact that applications very rarely operate
on the bytes of a document or stream, but instead on the abstracted content of a
document, as exposed via an API such as SAX, DOM or Expat, or an XSL node-set.
An XML database is free to store an XML document in any way it likes, as long as it
produces an equivalent document when required. It is this focus on APIs that shows
us how to give practical force to tbe goal of signing the abstract tree.
2.1 XML canonicalization
XML Canonicalization is somewhat complicated – the process is summarised in a
14-point list in Sect. 1.1 of [2], which much of the rest of that document elaborates
at length (this is generally abbreviated ‘C14N’, and appears to be specified inde-
pendently, and presumably equivalently, though without mutual cross reference, by
both [2] and [3]; when we refer to ‘C14N’ below, we are referring specifically to this
process). Much of the detailed complication, however, arises because the process is
still fundamentally canonicalizing one text file to another text file; it is a canonical-
ized serialization rather than a canonicalization of the XML tree itself. Furthermore,
the C14N specification requires that applications run arbitrary transformation script,
which is a potential and sometimes actual security hole in implementations [4].
The XML Signature specification (hereafter ‘xmldsig’; see [5] and [6]) is also a com-
plicated document, servicing an elaborate set of requirements [7]. These requirements
include being able to sign arbitrary fragments of a document, support for detached
signatures, the ability to sign composite documents listed in a manifest, signatures in
the presence of XLink and XPointer external references, and being able to sign various
transformations of the input including XSLT transformations. The W3C gathered a
list of significant implementability problems in the standard – or rather ‘topics of inter-
est’ – in a 2007 workshop,4 and these have informed the set of requirements for XML
Security 2.0.5 Whatever changes emerge, it is clear that the W3C’s XML Security
standard will remain a complicated solution to a complicated general problem.
Other pragmatically-motivated XML signing algorithms have been proposed. The
SAML ‘SimpleSign’ method [8] (which seems still to be a draft), and the XML-RSig
method (described and discussed in [9]; Johannes Ernst’s original reference seems to
have disappeared), both address a simplified problem, and both attempt, like xmld-
sig, to apply a normalization step to the XML source text – both of them, that is,
are ways of defining the blob of bytes to be signed. In doing so, they acquire some
robustness against the sort of accidental transformation which will frequently happen
to a document as it makes its way around the internet. But this is at best precarious,
4http://www.w3.org/2007/xmlsec/ws/report.html
5http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlsec-reqs2/
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and can be frustrated by a step as simple as transcoding an XML document from ISO-
8859 to UTF-8. These proposals also do not address the problem of round-tripping a
document into and out of an XML database, or making adjustments to a non-signed
part of a document in an XML editor.
If (we suppose) we cannot simplify the general solution, can we instead simplify or
relocate the problem?
Firstly, it seems likely that, in the majority of cases where XML applications would
benefit from signatures, the requirements are in fact rather simple, and boil down
to not much more than ‘is this the same XML document that the sender intended
to dispatch?’ In most cases, little or no transformation or composition of the input
document will be required, nor will, for example, signatures need to be themselves
signable.6
Secondly, we can relocate the problem by taking seriously the idea that the object
that the signature signs is the parse tree, and not an XML serialization of it.
The various canonicalization and digital signature implementations briefly discussed
above use the formal notion of the XML Information Set [10], which describes all of
the information which a complete XML processor must preserve and make available to
an application (the ‘canonicalization’ work of the XML Signatures WG is effectively
concerned with defining a single serializaton of this set).
The XML InfoSet is quite elaborate, and includes many of the features which may
be extracted from an XML document. The key observation for our present purpose is
that there are some features which it does not include: there is no ‘information item’
corresponding to the ordering of attributes, for example. The XML C14N view defines
documents as equivalent if they produce the same InfoSet, which means in effect that
they differ only in details which are interchangeable at or near the lexer level.
The SAX model, however, implicitly defines a much simpler information model for
XML, in terms of just 11 API functions (in the Java org.xml.sax.ContentHandler
interface); the Expat interface7 is structurally very similar, and supports 12 handler
functions (plus handlers for errors and DTDs); there are exactly analogous APIs in
other languages, which can consequently support the same model. In both cases, the
simplicity – compared to the XML C14N view – arises because the APIs view of the
document is the application’s view of the document. An API-level canonicalization
therefore implicitly defines a rather large class of equivalent documents, which blurs
lexical details and entity boundaries, but members of which must, crucially, have the
same semantics downstream. This canonicalization is insensitive to schemas, XInclude,
xml:base declarations, encodings and other upstream features which are typically re-
dundant to the parse: if the application sees something, it’s in the canonicalized
document; if not, not.
Because this processing is defined at the API level, it is straightforward to implement
it ‘en passant’ during parsing.
6It would be unsurprising if most current applications of xmldsig do in fact exploit some of these
features; this does not undermine the point: only such demanding applications are likely to invest
the costs of an xmldsig implementation.
7http://expat.sourceforge.net
5
Viewed through a SAX or Expat lens, an XML document is a rather simple thing,8
which is consequently very simple to normalize, serialize and thus sign.
3 A simple-enough normalization procedure
Here, we propose a very simple normalization mechanism, which straightforwardly
turns an XML document into a stream of bytes, in a well-defined, streamable, efficient
and partly reversible way. The resulting stream can be signed straightforwardly by
well-understood tools, and the signature embedded into the XML equally naturally.
The procedure below can be summarised as follows. Starting with an arbitrary XML
document x, we can obtain from this a binary blob b via
b = Norm(ESIS(x)),
where the ESIS step is a textual representation of the parse-tree of the document x
(described in Sect. 3.1 below), and the Norm step consists of a transformation of that
text into a unique binary blob (described in Sect. 3.2). Of course these steps can
naturally be combined into a single one in practice. The blob b can then be signed,
sx = Sign(b), and the result either distributed alongside the original document x, or
included within it in a <?signature...?> PI. Section 4 describes the implementation
of these steps in C and Java; an implementation would be straightforward in any
language which possesses an XML parser, and it might even be possible (as an amusing
exercise if nothing else) to implement it in XSLT if one’s tastes ran that way.
Although the two steps here may be conceptually similar to the C14N case, there
are two important differences.
Firstly, the normalization rules in Norm() are fewer, and all but one are nearly
trivial; the procedure builds upon the observation that a good deal of normalization
is, in effect, done for free by a conformant XML parser, in processing whitespace and
incorporating entities, and need not be re-specified.
Secondly, the operations Norm and ESIS are naturally defined in terms of the events
produced by a SAX-type parser, and so can be implemented during a parse, as a
side-effect of passing the parse events to the application (this mode is available in the
implementations described in Sect. 4). In contrast the Gutmann approach sg = Sign(x)
is defined in terms of the bytes of the unparsed XML document, which makes it at
least troublesome to both validate the document and use it: if one wants to do both,
it may be necessary to scan the document twice.
The simple normalization Norm ◦ESIS turns the XML:
<doc>
<p class=’foo’>Hello</p>
<p> there
chum
</p>
</doc>
8This is of course a large part of the point of XML.
6
into the normalized form:
(doc
Aclass foo
(p
-Hello
)p
(p
- there chum
)p
)doc
The bytes comprising this normalized form can then be signed, and the signature
reinserted into the original XML, or else made available as the parsed XML is passed
downstream.
The following document has the same normalized form as the previous one, but
includes a PGP signature block which can be used to verify it. The signature here is
the ASCII-armoured sx = Sign(Norm(ESIS(x))), not Gutmann’s sg = Sign(x).
<doc><p class="foo">Hello</p><p> there
chum </p>
<?signature armor=’-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
ABC123....
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----’?></doc>
3.1 An extended ESIS format
The textual representation is inspired by the ESIS format, which was originally defined,
in the 90s, as the output of the sgmls program [11]. The original point of the format
was that it should be easy for downstream tools to parse. The point here is that it
turns an XML file into an unambiguous sequence of lines and, further, that this can
then be turned into an unambiguous byte-stream by a simple normalization operation.
There isn’t a complete overlap between the ESIS and the SAX/Expat model. All
the differences here are extensions rather than changes.
The output consists of a sequence of lines. Each line consists of a start character
indicating which type of output record it represents, followed by one or more argu-
ments. There are always the same number of arguments, separated by a single space.
The extended syntax is described in Table 1. Each start element event is preceded by
the set of attributes on that event.
Notes to Table 1:
M and m The 〈prefix 〉 here is the XML prefix which is mapped to the given namespace
URI. In the case where the default prefix is mapped, the prefix is the empty
string.
string values In the 〈attvalue〉, 〈text〉 and PI 〈data〉 fields, any line-end characters are
escaped as \n, \r, \u0085 or \u2028 as appropriate. In the case of 〈attvalue〉, the
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M〈prefix 〉 〈uri〉 start prefix mapping∗
m〈prefix 〉 end prefix mapping∗
A〈attname〉 CDATA 〈attvalue〉 declare attribute
B〈namespace〉 〈localname〉 CDATA 〈attvalue〉 declare namespaced attribute∗
(〈name〉 start element
[〈namespace〉 〈localname〉 start namespaced element∗
)〈name〉 end element
]〈namespace〉 〈localname〉 end namespaced element∗
-〈text〉 character content
=〈text〉 ignorable whitespace∗
?〈target〉 〈data〉 processing instruction
X〈name〉 skipped entity∗
Table 1: Extended ESIS output. The extensions to the original ESIS output are
marked with a star.
string will have been normalized by the XML parser, as described in Sect. 3.3.3
of the XML 1.0 and 1.1 specifications. Note also that, as a result of the line-
end normalization rules (XML specs, Sect. 2.11), line-end characters other than
U+000a can appear only as the result of the expansion of a character reference.
This step is handled upstream by the XML parser and so does not need to be
specified here.
Ignorable whitespace This record can be generated by the presence of whitespace in
places where a DTD does not allow mixed content.
Processing instructions The 〈data〉 value is the content of the processing instruction
after removing any whitespace which follows the PI target, and removing any
whitespace which precedes the PI end marker (?>).
3.2 Normalizing the ESIS output
Given a representation of XML in this textual form, we normalize it using the following
procedure:
1. Ignorable whitespace (‘=’), skipped entities (‘X’), and start and end prefix map-
pings (‘M’ and ‘m’) are discarded.
2. All of the output is encoded to bytes as UTF-8.
3. Each of the lines is terminated by a CR LF pair (ie, bytes 0xd 0xa).
4. Attribute records (‘A’ and ‘B’) are ordered, as byte-strings, on output (this implies
that all of the ‘A’ records appear before the ‘B’ records). Each of the ‘B‘, ‘[’
and ‘]’ records include a 〈namespace〉 URI; these should be unchanged from the
form in which they appear in the XML document. This is consistent with the
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stipulation of [12, §2.3] (and cf. [13, §6.2]) that two namespace URIs ‘are identical
if and only if the strings are identical, that is, if they are the same sequence of
characters.’
5. Attributes which are in the namespaces http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace
or http://www.w3.org/2000/xmlns/ – that is, those attributes with a xml: or
xmlns: prefix – are discarded (APIs typically do not report these as element
attributes).
6. All of the attribute records are listed as CDATA, irrespective of any type declared
in a DTD.
7. Successive ‘-〈text〉’ events are merged before the following step.
8. The 〈attvalue〉, 〈text〉 and PI 〈data〉 values are normalized by collapsing all runs
of one or more whitespace characters to a single space (U+0020). This hap-
pens irrespective of whether the whitespace character was present in the in-
put XML as a character or as a character reference. This step is very similar
to the ‘attribute-value normalization’ of non-CDATA attributes as described in
Sect. 3.3.3 of the XML specifications, but without the exceptions for whitespace
character references. The ‘whitespace’ characters are: all of the characters be-
low U+0020, plus the NEL character (U+0085) and the Unicode line-separator
character (U+2028), and no others (the characters below U+0020 other than
tab, newline and carriage-return are either illegal characters, in XML 1.0, or
‘discouraged’, in XML 1.1, and so should never appear in the input, but are in-
cluded here for completeness). The characters U+0085 and U+2028 are special
in XML 1.1 but not in 1.0. The other Unicode whitespace characters (category
‘Zs’) are not taken to be ‘whitespace’ in this sense.
9. If a 〈text〉 record is empty after this normalization, or contains only whitespace,
it is discarded.
10. Any processing instruction which has a 〈target〉 of signature is removed.
The result of this is to transform and normalize XML as illustrated in Fig. 1.
In the normalized form, the prefix mappings have been removed (the prefixes are
not semantically important), whitespace has been collapsed within the ‘-〈text〉’ lines,
and two all-whitespace ‘-〈text〉’ records have been removed.
A programming instruction (PI) with 〈target〉 ‘signature’ (that is a PI of the form
<?signature ... ?>) is handled specially. The 〈data〉 portion of this PI consists of
a sequence of key-value pairs, where each value is enclosed in single or double quotes.
The only keys defined so far are:
algorithm This indicates the type of signature. Possible values include pgp to indicate
PGP signatures, and md5, sha1 or similar to indicate cryptographic hashes.
content This indicates the cryptographic hash of the content, or (depending on the
algorithm chosen) the PGP-armoured output of a PGP/GPG signature (that
is, starting with -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----).
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XML Un-normalized Normalized
<doc><pfx:p class=’foo’
xmlns:pfx="urn:NS"
pfx:att=’bar’
>Hello</pfx:p>
<p> &amp;&#xD;goodbye,
chum</p>
</doc>
(doc
Mpfx urn:NS
Aclass CDATA foo
Burn:NS att CDATA bar
[urn:NS p
-Hello
]urn:NS p
mpfx
-\n\n
(p
- &\rgoodbye,\nchum
)p
-\n
)doc
(doc
Aclass CDATA foo
Burn:NS att CDATA bar
[urn:NS p
-Hello
]urn:NS p
(p
- & goodbye, chum
)p
)doc
Figure 1: The transformation of XML into pseudo-ESIS form, and its subsequent
normalization.
target This indicates the element which is to be signed. It may have one of the values
/ or following::*[1], indicating respectively the whole document or the XML
element immediately following the signature PI. In the absence of this attribute,
the signature is taken to refer to the whole document. The permitted attribute
values are these literal strings. They are indeed syntactically XPath specifiers,
but there is no implication that an arbitrary XPath may be provided here.
The signature in question is a signature of the entire normalized output, Norm(ESIS(〈target〉)),
taken as a blob of bytes.
The signature PI may appear at any point in the input XML, and identifies a
signature for the complete XML document which includes it. In particular, it does
not matter in this scheme whether this PI, indicating the algorithm and signature, is
at the beginning of the document or at the end; having it at the beginning is slightly
harder to generate, but much easier to verify afterwards. We have not defined them
here, but it is easy to see how modest developments of this scheme might use the
<?signature...?> PI to indicate either a different element to sign, or a different
algorithm to use, or might use multiple PIs to separate the algorithm parameters at
the beginning of an element from the signature result at the end.
3.3 The equivalence class of documents under this normalization
This is a rather aggressive normalization: it defines a class of equivalent XML doc-
uments which is somewhat larger than the equivalence class implied by the C14N
procedure. In particular, (i) documents which differ only in whitespace are deemed
equivalent, and more radically (ii) all details of internal and external entities, and their
provenance, are lost. The rationale for this is that the distinctions represented by (i)
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are semantically insignificant in a very large variety of important cases, and those rep-
resented by (ii) are in any case invisible to a SAX/Expat client application. This does
mean that documents <d><p>a</p> <p>b</p></d> and <d><p>a</p><p>b</p></d>
(the first has a space between the ‘p’ elements) would be deemed equivalent; we assert
that this is unlikely to be a problem in practice.
This means that, although the transformation here is invertible, in the sense that
it can be reversed to produce an XML document which is equivalent to the original
in the sense described, that reconstructed document may look, at first glance, rather
different from the original.
By making these equivalences, we avoid a very large fraction of the complications of
the C14N algorithm, and produce a blob of bytes which is a natural object to receive
a digital signature.
4 Implementations
The process described here has been illustratively implemented in a Java class library
and a C library, which are available at https://bitbucket.org/nxg/xoxa. This
article corresponds to version 0.3.1 of the implementation.
Both libraries implement the transformation and normalization steps described here,
as command-line applications as well as an API.
The Java library provides (amongst other classes) a class SigningXMLReader which
subclasses the SAX XMLFilterImpl class, and so implements the SAX XMLReader
interface, and which in addition generates and checks GPG signatures within the
input XML. It can thus be swapped in to an application in place of such a SAX reader,
and work as that reader does, with the exception that, after the reader has completed
parsing the input document, it can be queried for details of any signature found within
the source XML, within a <?signature ...?> PI, including the verification status of
the signature.
The C library similarly provides an API for obtaining the normalized and unnor-
malized versions of an XML input file, as well as an interface for obtaining one or
other cryptographic digest of the normalized form. In addition, and analogously to
the Java library, it provides an API which exactly mirrors the Expat XML * functions,
in the sense that for each Expat function such as void XML SetStartElementHandler
(XML Parser, ...), there is a function named void Xoxa SetStartElementHandler
(Xoxa Parser, ...) with the same effect, which can therefore be dropped in as a
replacement. The difference is that it is then possible to query the Xoxa Parser object
to obtain a cryptographic digest of the normalized input XML (the C implementation
supports cryptographic digests but not, so far, PGP signatures).
In Table 2 we illustrate the relative performance of an identity XML transform (that
is, parsing XML, and then immediately serializing and writing it) using alternatively
the C-based Expat interface (that is, the XML * functions) and the C-based Xoxa one
(that is, replacing the XML * functions by the corresponding Xoxa * ones). In each
case, the programs are processing randomly generated XML.9 There is little variance
9Generated by XMark, see http://www.xml-benchmark.org. This produces non-pathological XML
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size/MB time(expat)/s time(xoxa)/s ratio time(digest)/s
11 0.370 0.781 211% 0.0437
35 1.054 2.28 216% 0.122
117 3.51 7.57 216% 0.395
351 10.65 23.0 216% 1.247
1172 35.8 76.2 213% 4.03
Table 2: Performance on identity transform, with Xoxa-C. The columns show the sizes
of the input files, the times to do an identity transform using the native Ex-
pat interface, and with the replacement Xoxa interface, including a digest
calculation. The last column is the time required to perform just a digest
calculation on the Xoxa-normalized file (that is openssl sha1 file.norm,
after first generating the file with xoxa file.xml >file.norm), with no sig-
nificant output. All of these figures are averaged over three instantiations of
the random test input.
size/MB time(default)/s time(xoxa)/s ratio time(gpg)/s
11 0.713 1.13 159% 0.0843
35 1.092 2.19 200% 0.237
117 2.43 5.75 237% 0.835
351 6.10 15.79 259% 2.48
1172 19.24 50.0 260% 8.39
Table 3: Performance on identity transform, with Xoxa-J; the columns are as in Ta-
ble 3, except that the final column is the time taken to verify GPG signatures
of a normalized input file (gpg --verify file.sig file.norm).
in the timings, and the increase in processing time in each case is very nearly linear
with the size of the input XML file. The extra layer of indirection at parse time, plus
the calculation of the SHA1 cryptographic digest, roughly doubles the run time in this
simple case. This is a worst case, however: a real application would do significantly
more with the parsed XML than simply write it out, so that we can see that the cost
of the extra processing would be minor in a real application. The processing in each
case is CPU-bound.
In Table 3 we illustrate the performance of an equivalent task using the Java imple-
mentation. In this case the identity transformation is implemented by
Result res = new StreamResult(System.out);
Transformer t = TransformerFactory.newInstance().newTransformer();
t.transform(src, res);
(the Java classes are from the javax.xml.transform package or its subpackages).
Here, the src is created in the default case by
with a roughly even mixture of markup and text content, and with random nesting depths up to
10 levels deep.
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Source src = new SAXSource(new InputSource(...));
and in the Xoxa case by
XMLReader rdr = uk.me.nxg.xoxa.SigningXMLReader.getXMLReader();
Source src = new SAXSource(rdr, new InputSource(...));
with no other differences. The rdr object can then be queried, after the parse, to
obtain information about the signatures. As with Table 2, the GPG run times are
linear with the input source size, but the Java run times only become linear above
100MB. As with the C case, the run time in the Xoxa case is increased by a factor
of two or three compared with the default case; as before, this would become less
significant in a real application which was doing something more substantial with the
input.
5 Conclusions
Cryptographically signing XML, and normalizing it prior to signing, are forbiddingly
intricate problems in the general case. This is largely because of the complexities of
the XML Information Set, and because of the decision to define the normalization
in terms of the input XML syntax rather than the parsed structures which are more
integral to the document.
In this article, we have described a transformation from an XML document to a
readily-signed blob of bytes which is:
1. straightforwardly described (partly because it sits on top of well-defined existing
processes such as XML parsing);
2. reasonably straightforward to implement; and
3. robust against trivial but likely changes to the source file, which might occur
during transmission or storage.
The procedure is naturally portable, and has been illustratively implemented in both
Java and C.
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